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1 “Internet addiction” has steadily made its way into a mainstream that is more willing
than  ever  to  medicalize  social  conflicts  (Conrad  &  Schneider,  1985)  and  to  cede
responsibility for them to psychiatry. 
2 Sociology  has  long  been  critical  towards  the  bio-somatic  medicalization  offered  by
psychiatry  and  the  concomitant  tendency  to  reduce  complex  social-interactional
dynamics to simple answers of “health” and “illness,” of “ordered” and “disordered”
behavior and personalities1, instead of identifying psychiatry as a form of social control
(Szasz, 1974: 260; Scheff et al., 1984: 19; Castel, 1983; Ussher, 1992, 1997; Showalter, 1987;
Ehrenreich & English, 1973). Many sociological treatments of this subject matter have
therefore treated “addiction” as a socially constructed meaning, an objectification of a
complex  social  situation  in  “disease”  terms  and  a  subjectification  of it  through its
location “in the person.” This has often taken the form of harsh criticism of psychiatry
as a naïve simplification of difficult and “thickly peopled” problems (most famously in
antipsychiatry, cf. Szasz, 1974; Cooper, 2001 [1967]; Laing, 1978; Basaglia, 1987, etc.).
3 Following this critical stance, I will not treat “addiction” as an illness, but rather treat
the treatment of it as an illness in everyday life as a tool that pragmatically resolves a
doubtful situation. Following Erving Goffman, the addiction trope helps people in social
conflicts over “involvement” (1963), i.e. over the attention and focus people bestow on
social situations and relationships. When one person is involved deeply in affairs that
the other person thinks take them away from their “correct” involvements, “addiction”
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can come up as a tool to stigmatize the unwanted involvement and enforce a return to
wanted involvements. It is important to emphasize in this context that “correct” is a
partisan judgment, not a given attribute of involvement: rather than assuming that
there are “natural” and “unnatural,” “healthy” and “diseased” forms of involvement,
these must be seen as group expectations. Equally, I will not treat these expectations as
“norms,” the breach of which leads to addiction ascriptions: they are, at first, nothing
but local pressures that the affected can heed, deny, play with and modify. “Addiction”
is a move in this game in which involvement is negotiated – a tool to negotiate the
reality of “adequate involvement.” The medicalization of this tool allows claimants to
enlist  the  power  of  the  medical  establishment  and  the  credibility  of  its  putative
“scientificity” to support their claims. Only if  successful can it be used to enforce an
involvement other than that which the “offender” presents to their surroundings. 
 
“Internet Addiction”
4 As is well known, the diagnostic category of “Internet addiction” was born from a joke.
On a mailing list in 1994, Ivan Goldberg utilized the common terminology associated
with addictions to ironically describe the experience of immersing oneself in the then-
nascent Internet, which then only consisted of slow exchanges of text in e-mails and
message boards  (Walter  & Schetsche,  2003:  10).  He  then coined the  term ”Internet
Addiction Disorder” to describe people’s “retreat” from the “real” world in favor of
interaction on these boards and in email exchanges, again, in jest. 
5 From this joke on, the concept has made its journey to official semi-recognition. The
advent of the development of this disorder “in earnest” is attributed to Kimberly Young
(Walter & Schetsche, 2003: 11; cf. Young 1997), who initiated questionnaire research to
validate such a “retreat”-disorder in an effort to localize classical addiction tropes in
those who spent “too much time” online. Though “Internet addiction” is not presently
an officially recognized “disorder” in the sense of having gained entry into the bibles of
disorders, the DSM-IV (APA, 2000) or ICD-10 diagnostic catalogs (Clark, 2011: 55), it can
be considered “recognized” in practice, as it is used to treat patients. A survey among
Swiss psychiatrists found that more than 80% of psychiatrists currently consider it a
psychiatric problem, and of those who receive an Internet addiction label, 32% receive
psychotherapeutic  treatment  and  34%  receive  combined  psychotherapeutic  and
pharmacological treatment (Thorens et al., 2009: 119). At the rate of the DSM’s expansion
(cf. Kirk & Kutchins, 1992, 1997; Caplan, 1995)2, it will undoubtedly soon be knighted to
the rank of official disorder as well. Murali and George tellingly speak of a disorder
“not yet recognized”3 (2007: 24) before proceeding, in the language of self-evident fact,
to put the number of “affected” persons inbetween two and five million (24). 
6 The first rule of organizational sociology is, of course, that institutions seek to protect
and enlarge their realm of influence and responsibility. It is thus not surprising that
psychiatrists  will  gratefully  accept  the  competence for  handling more interactional
conflicts. As a scientific endeavor, the way to such expansion is to provide scientific
studies supporting this expansion by showing how treatment helps ease the troubles of
the affected and how brain chemistry can be linked to this particular set of troubles
and  to  easing  them.  In  recent  years,  scholarship  critical  of  studies  that  allegedly
“prove”  the  biomedical  basis  of  these  troubles  and  the  effectiveness  of  medical
treatment has become more and more forceful (Moncrieff, 2009; Kirsch, 2009; Whitaker,
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2010,  2011),  but  that  is  not  a  debate  I  will  engage  in  here.  I  consider  this  critical
perspective  fully  convincing,  but  the  objective  of  this  piece  is  more  practical  than
debating the reality  of  biomedical  claims concerning psychiatric  “diagnoses.”  I  will
rather develop a sociological  framework for reconceiving psychiatry as a pragmatic
enterprise;  an institution that  produces “disorder” as  a  pragmatic  definition of  the
situation  in  order  to  solve  doubtful  situations.  This  involves,  as  a  necessary
prerequisite, a suspension of belief in behavioral problems as “illnesses”. But at the
same time it allows us to identify the pragmatic benefits of this belief in everyday life:
actors use “Internet addiction” as an illness ascription. With this, they deploy a social
meaning to persons-in-conflict and thus take sides in that conflict. Insofar as addiction
is ascribed to one person, “legitimate gripe” is ascribed to the person whose normality
is offended by the putative addict’s behavior. Thus, this deployment entails the support
of one definition of the situation over another.
 
Pragmatism
7 This paper will use a pragmatist-interactionist approach (Prus, 1996, 1997; Fine, 2010)
to analyze the social achievement of meaning and the social aims and consequences
that these achieved meanings themselves achieve. Like other interpretive sociologists,
pragmatists oppose realist epistemologies and abandon the question of “real” meanings
to  instead see  them as  humanly  produced.  To  pragmatists,  meanings  are  local  and
situational handles on a plural and fluid world that creates doubts that actors have to
deal with. Dewey proposes that “the natural approach to [...] sentences […] is not ‘Do
they get it right?‘, but more like ‘What would it be like to believe that?‘” (Rorty, 1982:
163). Pragmatists conceive descriptions as a part of human tool-making capacity (Rorty,
1982,  1989;  Fish,  1989;  Dellwing,  2011a).  They are  definitions  “of  the  situation in  a
situation” (Dellwing, 2011b: 205) that come up in contexts and with aims. Definitions of
the situation are thus ways of  “puzzle-solving” (Rorty,  1982:  193);  fixing a doubtful
situation to make concerted action possible. Meanings, in this view, are “simply tools of
coordinating our behaviour with those of others”, and claiming a definition “is to argue
about what we should do” (Rorty, 1999: xxiv) in a concrete context. Definitions of the
situation  achieve,  as  a  central  attribute,  the  adjustment  of  action  toward  objects,
together with others. 
8 When we see definitions of situations as a central part of joint action, conflicts come up
as a disturbance of shared definitions and joint actions. Acting together presupposes
acting  towards  an  object  with  the  same  definition  of  the  situation.  But  following
pragmatism’s outward emphasis, the internal definitions of the situations the actors
may carry are not important; they are in any case invisible. Conflicts, from a pragmatic
perspective, come up when joint action is stalled and a resolution must be found that
reintegrates action by reintegrating definitions of the situation: it is only in situations
of conflict that the shared definitions of the situation, usually hidden, come to the fore.
9 In  sociological  scholarship,  this  practice  of  reintegrating  definitions  to  overcome a
breach in joint action has often been researched under the heading “aligning actions”
(Stokes & Hewitt,  1976).  These are “various tactics,  ploys,  methods,  procedures and
techniques” (Lyman & Scott, 1986: 838) that include, but are not limited to, disclaimers
(Hewitt & Stokes, 1975), motive talk (Mills, 1940; Blum & McHugh, 1971; Albas & Albas,
2003), quasi theorizing (Hewitt & Hall, 1973), excuses and explanations (Lyman & Scott,
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1986; Goffman, 1971). They supply ready tools for “aligning individual lines of conduct
when obstacles arise in its path” (Stokes & Hewitt, 1976: 839), to reestablish common,
joint action (Blumer, 1986 [1969]). With their help, “interaction may proceed toward a
social object” (Stokes & Hewitt, 1976: 842) when that joint action hits obstacles, when
“some feature of a situation is problematic“ (Stokes & Hewitt, 1976: 838). “Problematic”
is not a naturally arising state of an interaction, however, but an active achievement
that comes up when an interaction partner dramatizes irritation regarding an action of
another, who is then called upon to make amends and realign (though resistance is, of
course,  a  possibility;  cf.  Dellwing,  2013).  Psychiatry  provides  a  strong  form  of
alignment, and the addiction description of persons works as one particular instance of
such psychiatric alignment. In this framework, the right questions therefore are: When
and where do psychiatric tools come up; what do they do; in what context; for whom?
Empirically, then, there is such a disease because it is recognized, diagnosed, and acted
upon by medical professionals and lay people. It is a situation of the definition that is
used, and one that has clearly recognizable consequences. 
 
Psychiatry Pragmatism: Diagnoses as Tools
10 Psychiatry as an institution defines cases as problems and then “solves” them. From
the psychiatrist’s perspective, patients and problems are no longer problematic, but
become  objects  of  cure  after  a  diagnosis  has  been  used  on  them.  Psychiatry  thus
provides tools for the alignment of action when divergences disrupted it. As such, it is
one tool among many; the entire field of aligning actions discusses tools of this sort,
and  psychiatry  is  not  qualitatively  special  in  this  regard.  However,  it  is  special  in
magnitude and in the institutional support for definitions of the situation it provides.
11 Analyzing psychiatric intervention as a specific form of aligning action allows us to
reconceptualize the situations in which these alignments arise as scenes of definitional
rifts and unaligned action (rather than as “symptomatic behavior” and “disease”). It
conversely allows us to reconceptualize the practice of psychiatry as, as Erving Goffman
famously termed it, a “tinkering trade” (1961: 321) that deals with these disalignments.
Psychiatric categories, Bowers argues, constitute “only the provision of a name, not of a
name  and  explanation  [...]  There  are  only  names  of  syndromes  and  statistical
prognoses, plus some pragmatic treatments” (Bowers, 1998: 74).
12 The  classic  formulation  of  a  pragmatist  approach  to  “mental  illness”  is  offered  by
Erving Goffman. Lofland writes “Goffman is an Emerson, a James, a Dewey, or a Mead”
(Lofland, 1984: 12). Goffman stated bluntly that he was not animated by deep respect
for the discipline (1961), but still conceded that if psychiatry didn’t exist, it would have
to  be  invented  (1972).  It  provides  a  service  that  no  other  alignment-producing
institution can easily absorb:  it  mobilizes medical-scientific  support in favor of  one
party in a social conflict over definitions of the situation. A sociological perspective,
especially with interpretive inclinations, refuses to decide on “reality”, “rationality”, or
“appropriateness”  of  these  definitions.  It  is  merely  interested  in  the  empirical
processes in which these definitions are supported, how coalitions for their support are
built, and what social consequences these processes entail.
13 This is the core of Goffman’s pragmatist approach to psychiatry: he is interested in
situations in which ascription of mental illness comes up as moves in a social conflict
about definitions of the situation, i.e. about meanings that people ascribe to themselves
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and others, to their relative roles and positions, and to objects in their vicinity: “Mental
symptoms (…) are acts by an individual which openly proclaims to others that he must
have  assumptions  about  himself  which  the  relevant  bit  of  social  organization  can
neither allow him nor do much about” (Goffman, 1972: 356). They are acts by which the
other person “secedes” in his or her definition of reality. As definitions of the situations
live between people rather than in them or in objects, when one person in significant
relationships  reneges  on  these  shared  definitions,  others  “cease  to  be  sure  about
themselves” (Goffman, 1972: 366) and their definitions as a consequence as well. This
definitional disloyalty of a deep member threatens the group’s safety coalition about
their world. Insofar as the relationships are supported through joint action, the demise
of joint definitions signals the demise of these relationships: others depend not just on
the definitional loyalty of their friends and colleagues, but also on their loyalty when it
comes  to  maintaining  negotiated  role-positions.  Reneging  on  shared  definitions  of
reality can thus quickly be seen as to entail reneging on the social relationships and the
normalities that they have held so far in them themselves. The title of Goffman’s essay,
The Insanity of Place, points to this angle: those defined as “mentally ill” are those who
“break rank,” who do not keep their place in the wider sense of not keeping with role
performance expectations, i.e. with the actions others expect based on their definition
of the situation. In that sense, a broken expectation is already indicative of a conflict of
definitions  of  the  situation.  However,  whether  this  broken expectation becomes an
actual conflict depends on the actors acting on their irritation, i.e. it depends on them
halting joint action until aligning actions realign it. Others try to reinforce the old role
or negotiate a new one, and the role-shifting person refuses to play along.4
14 Psychiatry does not take charge of these situations right away: it is not the first line of
role  defense.  Acts  can  be  sanctioned,  the  deviant  pressed  back  into  his  role  with
anything from persuasion to force. Only when these attempts remain unsuccessful and
the role-breach is sustained over these reactions does psychiatric control arise. In this
sense, what comes to be known as symptoms “deviate from other deviations. A person
who suddenly becomes selfish, heartless, disloyal, unfaithful or addicted can be dealt
with. If he properly shows cause or contrition, he can be forgiven; if he is unrepentant
but removable he can be redefined. In either case, his others can come to terms with
him” (Goffman, 1972: 366) When he is unrepentant, i.e. other means of social control
fail, and also cannot be removed, i.e. cutting ties to the partner-in-definition is seen to
not be an option, a cul-de-sac arises. The person sustains his role-breach and yet he is
kept in the social circle. He makes trouble from the inside. 
15 Psychiatric re-definitions of the person and his behavior help remedy this hopeless
situation  by  providing  a  definition  of  the  situation  that  retains  the  “ideal”  person
within the circle, but defining the real person to be “buried” and trapped behind a false
façade  maintained  not  by  the  person  but  by  the  “disease”.  The  irritated  persons
consider that the actions that alienated them were not actions of the “real person” but
rather involuntary symptoms.  At the same time,  the flesh-and-blood person can be
removed and institutionalized under the definition of medical treatment in his own
best interest, even if he violently protests it. The ideal person remains inside the social
circle, the offending diseased person is removed, and since removal happens under the
definition  of  treatment  it  happens  under  the  definition  of  care  for  the  needy.
Psychiatry thus provides a definition of the situation that allows a “loving removal”; a
physical removal that is caring and helpful and thus not an ideal removal at all.
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16 This is where, following Goffman, psychiatry would have to be invented did it not exist.
The solution it offers is extremely practical to maneuver one’s way out of a cul-de-sac,
by defining the social relationship that may “appear” broken as “in fact” continuing,
only buried by “merely physical” blocks that  keep the “real” person from “coming
through”. This realignment practice is complete when the person who “caused” the
irritation engages in “the greatest ritual work of all”: ascribing illness as the cause for
his or her definitional infidelity. “Therapy”, in addiction ascriptions, is successful when
the offending actor defines his or her action as a role-breach as well. In the vernacular
of therapy, this is “recognizing one has a problem”; the famous “first step” towards a
cure. This achieves the final step, realigning the physical person with the ideal one that
had been feigned to keep up relations all along. By retroactively taking the disease role
that the others had ascribed to him/her, the “patient” ratifies the feigned role after the
fact and allows it to be the official and accepted ascription on his role breach. Taking
the role again, he retroactively states that he, correctly understood, had always held it.
This realignment practice is widely usable, as the ongoing expansion of the field of
psychiatry tends to attest. It is the practical use, and the social acceptance of that use,
that make its consequences real. 
 
“Addiction” as a Tool for Enforcing Involvement
17 Analyzing the different, overlapping and fuzzily delineated (Kirk & Kutchins, 1992: 239)
“disease categories” offered by psychiatry not as “truths” about the world but rather as
pragmatic tools, ways to get out of different cul-de-sacs, solutions to different kinds of
conflicts  over social  definitions of  reality,  would be a  project  in its  own right.  The
present paper is only concerned with one of them: internet addiction ascriptions. The
interactional  disturbance that  is  aligned through this  categorization can already be
found in Goffman’s analysis: addiction ascriptions control the balance of involvements
in social life and provide accounts for a specific kind of “breaches of involvement” that
Goffman calls “away” (1963: 69 ff.).
18 Goffman notes  that,  in  any social  situation,  there  are  different  dominant  and side-
involvements  to  be  balanced (Goffman,  1963).  Involvements  are  calls  on a  person’s
attention and on their dramatization of being present, interested and up to speed with
what is going on in the situation and the others’ expectations of it. To be “away” is to
disengage  from  any  acceptable  dominant  involvement  to  fall  into  reveries,
engagements with minor and socially unimportant matters, fugue states, etc. (Goffman,
1963: 43). There are acceptable phases of “away,” i.e. waiting for the main engagement
to start (in waiting rooms), being transported to main engagements (on a train), being
in accepted “disengagement zones” (like a beach or a sauna), disengaging to involve
oneself with “nonpersons” or “incomplete persons” (like children or pets), or be in a
disengaged reverie for very short periods of time, ready to “snap back” (p. 74) to the
dominant  engagement  at  any  point.  These  kinds  of  “away”  do  not  infringe  on the
involvements others expect to be maintained, and leave the actors ready to underscore
the importance of the important engagements when called upon to do so, either by
breaking the “away” phase immediately or by having accounts for being away that
underscore one’s respect for the dominant involvement. 
19 One of the mainstays of psychiatrically relevant behavior, Goffman contends, consists
of unexcused and unexplained presentations of being “away” (Goffman, 1963: 69 ff.), i.e.
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those  that  the  surroundings  define  as  unacceptable  and those  the  explanations  for
which other actors do not accept. Psychiatrically relevant disinvolvements are those
that cannot be broken by outside interruption or that cannot be accounted for in ways
that respect the main involvement. These kinds of “awayness” appear to onlookers as
what Goffman calls “occult”: “a kind of awayness where the individual gives others the
impression, whether warranted or no, that he is not aware he is ‘away’” (p. 75). That is,
when the individual is not aware that the outside even defines one’s actions as “away”
in the first place. These can be schizophrenic aways where unshared fears are followed
or  voices  no  one  else  hears  are  heard:  emotional  aways  where  emotional
dramatizations are presented that others do not consider proper. All of these are, then,
involvements defined as dominant by those who engage in them, while the outside
defines them as “away”. The “addiction away” is a question of time and involvement
management of a more direct kind. Resources, attention and simple time are given to
tasks  that  the  surroundings  do  not  classify  as  a  legitimate  activity  –  a  legitimate
involvement that is.
20 These activities are then the objects of a major conflict regarding the definition of the
situation: these “away-involvements” include activities that are “patently tasklike but
not  ‘understandable’  or  ‘meaningful’”  (Goffman,  1963:  75).  Addiction  covers  the
involvements that are understandable to the outside, but not acceptable. They do not
“lack meaning” in their own right (they are meaningful to the persons who engage in
them  and  can  be  understood  by  others),  but  they  lack  a  common  definition  of
appropriateness in the light of other expectations. The actor does not define his or her
action as an “away” at all, but rather as a legitimate and meaningful involvement in its
own right, and refuses “away” as a common definition by refusing to break it for other
involvements that observers consider dutifully dominant. However, the action based on
these  meanings  appears  meaning-  and  pointless  from  an  outside  perspective:  “the
others  present  cannot  ‘get  at’  the  general  intention by  which  the  individual  is
apparently governed, and cannot credit the offender’s account should he offer one” (p.
74).
21 Addiction ascriptions fall squarely into this category. Seeing cases in which addiction
ascriptions are used when there is  a failure to define “away” together allows us to
understand  the  social  dynamics  of  “addiction”  definitions.  “Addiction”  is  a  tool  to
socially control unaccepted “aways” and to enforce the joint honoring of (what one side
considers to be) dominant involvements. These involvements are “dominant” only to
some at the outset of the situation, and the “away” is, in fact, treated as a dominant
involvement by the “offender”. The addiction trope is a way to produce and enforce
alignment concerning the definition of dominant involvements. 
22 These instances of conflicts over the “correct” definition of a main involvement and a
breach  of  it  as  “away”  can  be  plentiful.  Gambling,  states  of  altered  consciousness
through  substances,  involvement  in  the  pursuit  of  sexual  encounters,  etc.,  can  all
appear,  to  outsiders  with  their  own  expectations  of  dominant  involvement,  as
illegitimate and disturbing “aways”.  Addiction is  a  behavior  that  others  so  label  to
(re-)enforce dominant involvements and thus re-enforce existing role distributions and
social  “places”.  Therefore,  “addiction”  is  regularly  an  outside  ascription.  The
“afflicted” generally have to be brought to understand themselves as “addicted” by
advocates,  experts  or  moral  entrepreneurs  (Schetsche,  2007:  122),  but  this  is  a
relational and contextual achievement. If addiction is a tool in interpersonal conflicts
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over involvement, there is no addiction ascription without an interpersonal dynamic.
This  is,  of  course,  the  gist  of  the  interactionist  sociology  of  deviance  and  Howard
Becker’s  famous definition that  “deviant  behavior  is  behavior  that  others  so  label”
(Becker, 1963: 9), and so label for specific purposes in specific contexts.
23 From  a  perspective  that  focuses  on  the  processes  in  which  joint  definitions  of
involvement  are  produced,  this  “recognition”  is  merely,  and  non-normatively,  an
alignment.  Disaligned definitions of  involvement are realigned when the “offender”
redefines their own activity as an “away”,  breaks from it,  and re-engages what the
other side defined as “dominant”. It is, thus, an alignment in favor of the person(s)
whose definition of “dominant engagements” was irritated and an alignment of action
toward the expectations of those persons. What appears to the involved entrepreneurs
as “creating awareness”, a conceptualization based on the definition that the addiction
ascription  captures  an  objective  truth,  appears  to  constructionist  and  pragmatist
sociologists alike as a struggle to fix a contingent definition of a situation that could
also have been fixed differently.
24 This is iconoclastic and no radical position at the same time. On the one hand, it is
necessary  for  the  medicalized  talk  of  symptomatology  to  objectify  symptoms  in
descriptive  catalogs  and  subjectify  them  by  locating  them  exclusively  within  the
person.  For  this  purpose,  psychiatric  institutions  need  stripped-down  “descriptive”
elements that can be listed and checked off in a decontextualized manner. On the other
hand, psychiatry has always been explicit about handling social conflicts and includes
this recognition within the formal catalog that seeks to expunge this situated nature of
category  application.  Most  DSM  diagnoses  entail,  as  a  necessary  condition,  the
“symptom” of  a  disruption in social  relationships and function.  The presence of  “a
disruption in social  relationships” as  a  separate but  necessary category that  stands
alone de facto makes the social disruption the core “symptom”, hidden in plain sight
behind a list of more objective-sounding “descriptive” conditions. 
 
“Internet Addiction” and the Enforcement of Close
Involvements
25 Addiction ascriptions, then, come up in battles over involvement. “Internet addiction”
comes up in battles over what I could call “cyberinvolvement”. As such, they come up
within conflictual, “thickly peopled” (Strauss, 1993: 25) and deeply contextual social
situations.
26 A  summary  piece  on  the  “effects”  of  Internet  addiction  reads  like  a  list  of  social
expectations by the most socially accepted reference groups: the family, partners and
superiors at work and in college. Studies on the “problems” caused by “excessive” use
of the Internet cite that “respondents reported that Internet use had interfered with
either their academic work, professional performance, or social lives” (Chou et al. 2005:
364).  Kimberly  Young  (1997: 237)  also  names  “academic  failure,  reduced  work
performance, and even marital discord and separation” as consequences of “internet
addiction.”  Murali  and  George  (2007:  25)  note  that  supposed  “internet  addictions”
cause “people to neglect sex, grooming, work.” The problem “caused” by excessive use
of the internet is seen as a “failure to manage time” (Chou et al. 2005: 364); these fields
are  easily  identifiable  as  conflicts  over  involvement  in  which  involvement  in  the
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internet  or  in  online  games  clashes  with  those  of  these  reference  groups:  family,
employers, teachers. This is the general triangle of time control in internet addiction
cases:  The  family  enforces  its  time  against  what  is  perceived  as  “alone-time”  or
“withdrawn  time,”  against  what  looks  like  an  “away”  from  their  perspective;  the
employer and the school defends their time and the presence concerning their tasks,
seeing internet time as an “away” from homework and preparation and from alertness
and presence concerning employment expectations. The family is by far the biggest
involvement enforcer in this picture.
 
Family and Close Social Relationships
27 Close  relationships  do  not  necessarily  come  with  set  time  commitments.  Many
relationships  endure  long-distance  setups  with  infrequent  meetings,  commuting  to
work  that  draws  attention  away  from  the  family  for  most  of  the  day,  in  some
arrangements even for entire weeks. There is no solid set of expectations on how much
time has to be spent with the family. Participants negotiate the value and hierarchical
position of their social  relationship vis-à-vis other social  relationships to determine
super- and subordination, i.e. which relationship takes precedence in an involvement
conflict. Whatever arrangement there is in a particular family is negotiated within it
and with an eye to the looking glass self-expectations attributed to outside spectators
who will  judge  the  family  and negotiate  the  family  members’  own judgments  with
them.  This  joint,  thickly  peopled  and  deeply  social  determination  of  family  time
schemes is a complex game of thrones. In it, participants are often expected to at least
privilege the family as a matter of lip service; in practice, work involvements tend to
take precedence in action, and work involvements can easily be used to reduce family
involvement: It is a banal point that if someone works as a broker and spends night and
day in front of a networked computer connected to the world’s stock market to an
extent  that  wife,  children,  and  friends  are  “neglected,”  ascribing  an  “internet
addiction” would be at best odd. 
28 It is in this context that participants enforce family involvement against those who are
seen  to  place  an  undue  hierarchical  position  on  non-family,  non-employment
involvement. Indeed, this is the main area in which “internet addiction” is used as an
account for illegitimate awayness and as a tool to control this awayness. “The greatest
negative impact tends to be on family and social life, as excessive time spent online
often results in neglect of family, social activities and interests” (Murali and George
2007: 25). Shapira et al. (2000: 269) report what they call “significant social impairment
(e.g. family strife or divorce) in 19 (95%) subjects”. This is already a partisan value-
judgment in which the expectation of one side of a relationship, and those most likely
to be supported by social coalitions around the family, is given normative status and
defended  by  way  of  calling  the  failure  to  honor  these  particular  expectations  an
“impairment”. The fact that it “disrupted marriages” (see also Young, 1997: 240) and
caused  “relationship  problems”,  disrupted  expected  interactions  in  the  sexual  and
romantic departments as well as in the context of taking care of children and making
time for friends (Chou et  al., 2005: 364) is seen, in the clinical view, as an objective
irritation rather than the irritation of particular others in particular relationships. The
literature goes as  far  as  using the dramatic  term “‘cyberwidow’ […] to refer  to the
neglected partners of Internet addicts” (Murali & George, 2007) for those whose use of
the Internet the literature feels secure to call “excessive” (Young, 1997: 240).
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29 What transpires in these situations is that “dependents often preferred their on-line
friends over their real-life relationships” and “gradually spent less time with friends
and family in exchange for solitary time in front of a computer” (Young, 1997: 240).
They “neglected their spouses in place of continual electronic rendezvous with on-line
lovers,  leaving  no  quality  time  for  their  marriages”.  This  irritated  other  concrete
persons, who “first rationalized the obsessed Internet user's behavior as ‘a phase,’ in
hopes  that  the  attraction  would  soon  dissipate”.  When  that  did  not  happen,
“arguments […] soon ensued”, and the literature stays true to its partisan line in calling
the resistance the Internet users put up against this communication of irritation as
“denial exhibited by Dependents”. When they “became angry and resentful at others
who questioned or tried to take away their time from using the Internet”, this can only
appear to clinicians as another symptom of addiction: an “addict's response”, not the
reaction of  a  person defending her  autonomy against  those  who presume to  know
better than she does how she should spend her time. To enlist psychiatry to break these
”illegitimate”  involvements  necessitates  this  partisan  interpretation:  no  action  is
possible without determining the locus of the issue, and to “find” it within the person
and  his  or  her  “unnatural”  choices  of  involvement  is  what  allows  a  medicalized
reaction in the first place. Psychiatry here appears clearly as an involvement control
tool that naturalizes one set of expectations, generally that of the spouse, over another




30 Other than family members, employers, teachers and school administrators define non-
school  and non-employment involvements  as  “aways”.  The literature  bemoans that
“Internet addiction can lead to poor academic performance in school and college”
(Murali & George, 2007). In other words, that deep commitment to one’s studies suffers
when time is spent on “the Internet”. Again, the clear partisan nature of diagnosis is
evident here. Young is quick to term Internet use that is not directly related to college
assignments as surfing “irrelevant web sites,” and is equally certain that online games
come “at the cost of productive activity” (1997: 270), thereby explicitly assuming that
“productivity” is a clear and determinable fact rather than a perspective-dependent
and therefore conflictual definition of the situation. “Such Internet misuse”, as Young
(1997: 270) calls these activities, leads to a lack of sleep and therefore reduced academic
performance.  They  thus  lead  to  an  irritation  of  the  very  partisan  expectations  of
teachers and possibly parents. One of the perhaps funniest “diagnostic descriptions” in
this regard can be found in Chou et al. (2005): “Teachers may notice that fewer and
fewer students are willing to take early morning classes, and some of those who do
register for morning classes regularly come in late. It has also come to the attention of
some  school  administrators  that  some  students  get  poor  grades  or  are  placed  on
academic probation because they spend too much time on the Internet rather than on
their studies” (p. 364). There is a distinct air of surreality in this gripe that exposes the
ways in which these ascriptions come up simply to enforce one set  of  involvement
expectations over another one that is quite understood, but seen as inappropriate.
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The Self
31 As obvious as reformulating these diagnoses as involvement control mechanisms may
be, they have not yet arrived at the heart of the medical model’s utility. Using medical
descriptions and medical intervention to enforce a party’s definition of an involvement
as an illegitimate one, and thus as “away”, entails a redefinition of roles which includes
the acceptance of that role by the controlled. Many of the involvement breaches are
thus socially defined as breaches of “correct” involvement with the self.  Studies cite
what they consider “norm breaches”, as for example neglect of “food and health”, as a
“symptom” of Internet addiction (Murali & George, 2007).
32 Thus, the official account charges the neglect of self-involvements: grooming, food, sex
and social life. One interesting aspect is the naturalization of sex, which is at first the
naturalization of the partner’s expectation that their loved one make time for sexual
involvement with them, then shifted to the putative “addict” as an offense against their
own “natural”  sex  drive.  When these  “descriptive  categories”  are  institutionalized,
partnerless  “victims” can even have their  partnerless  status  ascribed as  a  symptom,
meaning that their surroundings will claim that they should have “others” that should
be more important than their other involvement, and that not seeking this “legitimate”
involvement  is  in  itself  a  problem.  This  points  towards  another  naturalization:  the
outside  expectations,  once  naturalized,  become  ascribed  as  the  personal  “real”
interests and drives of the afflicted who is bulldozed by the “addiction.” Among the
things  neglected  named by  the  summary  text,  we  can  find  frequent  ascriptions  of
outside interests as the afflicted’s own interests.
33 This is,  of  course,  the classical  twist  in the addiction trope.  Though it  prominently
supports  the expectations of  others,  it  locates  the interest  and will  to  follow these
expectations within the afflicted themselves.  The addiction makes people do things
they normally would not do and present the face of the disease rather than their true
self. This is an ingenious account, as Goffman already noted, to protect broken sociality.
The surrounding persons who have their expectations broken can attribute the breach
to the disease rather than the person: the hurtful things done by that person are then
not to be understood as an expression of the “real” intent to ignore and neglect them.
The “real” person would never do this, and once this real person is reestablished, the
expectations will be kept once more. In keeping these expectations, they keep in place
the relationships that underwrite them, and thus return to social places they never
“really” left, as if what left that place was a “what” – the disease – and not a “who” in
the form of the person. The status quo ante is reestablished when the afflicted engages
in ritual accounting work to divorce his present self from the “it” that overwhelmed it,
“confessing” in the process that there was this “it”. The ritual work that reestablishes
the social relationships replete with the expectations that had hold before goes along
with a role-taking as “having been ill all along” when the game is successful.
34 Acceptance takes the form of slow disengagement with the role that others ascribe to
those who will become “patients”. This takes the form of “marked personal distress
over their behaviors” (Shapira et al. 2000: 269). Howard Becker already noted that those
who ascribe deviance to others can themselves be seen as deviant by their “victims”
(Becker, 1963), and those who are defined as deviant but do not accept this definition
will  then  attempt  to  avoid  or  react  against  those  who  ascribe  these  deviant  roles:
“similar to alcoholics who will try to hide their addiction, Dependents engaged in the
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same efforts to lie or hide how long they spent on-line” (Young, 1997: 240). This lying is




35 These “aways” from involvements expected by others, and projected on a supposed
“real self” who would control them were s/he sane, could, in a first attempt at turning
a  sociological  corner,  be  considered  irritations  of  social  norms  instead  of  natural
symptoms:  cleanliness,  attention to  family,  a  work  ethic,  the  maintenance  of
relationships, etc. However, that would not only be superficial and obvious, it would
also serve to steamroll the complexity of a plural social world. Norms, though a staple
of sociological argumentation, are but a shorthand, and to explain any social action
through recourse to “norms” is to not explain the dynamics of the situation at all. In
any actual situation, norms are legitimating reasons cited for the support of action.
Norms, however, do not act. Only people act, and concrete people have to interpret, i.e.
define the situation in which they have to interpret the norm with reference to the
situation (cf.  Dellwing, 2009, 2011a).  Every normative judgment is a local,  fresh and
unavoidably situational and contextual judgment (Fish, 1989). This is not to deny order.
It  only  denies  that  order  is  a  transcendent  force  imposing itself  without  becoming
bogged down the muddied waters of the situation. As Gary Fine quotes Charles Edgley,
this pragmatist-interactionist stance “makes order fully situational” (Fine, 2010: 355). A
pragmatist analysis cannot stop at norms but needs to recognize that social orders are
locally  negotiated  and  subject  to  the  contingent  and  chaotic  internal  dynamic  of
emergent situations (cf. Shalin, 1986).
Thus, to merely see these diagnostic criteria as an expression of abstract “social norms”
is  not  only reductionist,  it  also universalizes  someone’s  interpretation and partisan
judgment  as  “normative” without  regard  for  the  situational  dynamics  and  the
conflictual sides in them. To merely argue diagnoses as defenses of “social norms,” as
much sociology of psychiatry tends to do, thus hinders understanding more than it
helps. In  dubious  situations,  actors  reflexively  and purposefully  interpret  norms in
light of concrete issues, doubts and loyalties. Their interpretation of said norms is thus
contextual  and  partisan,  so  that  these  situations  are  not  instances  of  “normative
ordering” but of local productions of contextual orders. This requires that we mind
social relationships and loyalties, role distributions, authority ascriptions, shared pasts
and aims, ongoing conflicts and most importantly the continuous negotiation of all of
these as social meanings in “continuous permutations of action” (Strauss, 1993). The
right  question,  then,  is  not  “what  social  norm  are  these  'patients'  breaking?”  but
rather:  who  has  what  expectations;  in  what  context;  with  what  shared  history,
concerning involvements? Who enforces them; with which aims; in what relationships
and loyalties; with what authority? (cf. Dellwing, 2009). 
 
The Non-Aways
36 Another group, one that Brenner (1997) in his survey called “Internet friends”, stands
on the other side of this conflict: the “affected” showed “trouble with employers or
social isolation except for Internet friends” (cited in Chou, Codron, and Belland 2005:
364).  In  other  words,  the  expectations  of  one  group  were  broken  in  favor  of  the
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expectations of another group and the evaluating outside institution valued one kind
over the other. 
Dependents enjoyed those aspects of the Internet,  which allowed them to meet,
socialize  and  exchange  ideas  with  new people  through these  highly  interactive
mediums (Young, 1997: 240)
37 Of  course,  distinguishing  “Internet  friends”  from  “real  friends”  is  a  practice  long
engaged in by scientists who do not regularly use the Internet. In the age of Facebook
and the digital world, it  is difficult to distinguish the two, and many a relationship
thrives only because there are ways to engage in ritual work in social networks where
previously there had been no ways to do so in any context. It is for this reason that the
authors do not subscribe to the deficit narratives they find in the studies they survey.
They note that young people, i.e.  those who grew up with a thoroughly normalized
view  of  online  communication,  reported  “strong  positive  influences  on  their peer
relations” (Young, 1997: 369), as the Internet provides “users with the opportunity to
meet  new people,  provide additional,  if  not  primary,  tools  for  communicating with
friends, and create more topics to share with them” (p. 370). 
 
A Game of Involvements
38 However,  the  article  also  defines  “time-disruption,  leading  to  interference  with
academic work, professional performance, daily routines,  and so on” as a “negative
impact” (Young, 370). The normalizers seem to be unable to help themselves when it
comes  to  reiterating  mainstream  news  accounts  of  “the  Internet”.  While  the
descriptions offered in the diagnostic and epidemiological literature allow a glimpse
into the interactions and the local  conflicts  in  which these diagnoses  appear,  their
generalized  formulation  and  complete  lack  of  attention  to  the  shared  pasts,  role
distributions  and  contextual  aims  in  these  conflicts  make  them  utterly  unable  to
convey the intricate net that is social interaction as well as the local and intentional use
of abstractions in social interaction. When we reconceptualize “addiction ascriptions”
as means to control prolonged cases of “away” that someone does not accept because
they disturb someone’s idea of a correct role position, we can open a whole new field of
inquiry.  The  interesting  questions  now  become  whose expectations  are  enforced  in
which contexts and constellations. Ethnographic research then has to concern itself
with concrete situations in concrete contexts. 
39 This reformulation has, of course, a much wider applicability than merely to Internet
addiction ascriptions. Sociological research has long noted how “addiction” is a social
role that depends as much on social expectations of “addict roles” and their linkage to
specific substances (or, now, activities) as on the chemical compounds found in them
(Adler, Adler & O’Brien, 2012). Using Goffman’s ideas on involvement, addiction can be
widely  seen  as  a  tool  to  stigmatize  forms  of  involvement  that  social  circles  find
problematic. Other non-substance involvements that break social expectations can be
understood this way. Sex addiction, for instance, is a form of promiscuity and frequent
sexual activity that is not only offensive to social circles and/or takes time away from
other more legitimate enterprises, but that also, and most importantly, leads persons
to use contexts in which they would be expected to have other aims for sex: the person
overwrites aims and purposes associated with business or academic interactions and
uses  these  contexts  to  seek  sex  rather  than the  desired  results  within  the  field  of
business or academia. Once we walk this path, we can locate involvement conflicts in
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many disorder categories far beyond the “new addictions”. “Classical” addiction stories
such  as  alcoholism  also  control  involvement.  Even  the  most  central  of  psychiatric
illness categories can be analyzed as a form of involvement control. Depression, for
instance, is a medicalized control narrative for people who spend, in the judgment of
their social circle, too much time with negative and problematic thoughts and outlooks,
too much time with themselves and in retreat,  and upkeep a negative emotionality
(even when it  is  not  shown)  with  too  much effort,  so  that  intervention is  deemed
necessary to “repair” normal involvement with worries, the social circle and negative
emotions. Rather than naturalize these ideas of involvement – that there is a “naturally
right” amount of self-worry, of emotional display, of activities that others may deem
“obsessive”,  etc.,  these  social  controls  of  involvement  involve  a  normalization  of
involvement regimes in certain contexts. The task of sociology is to recover these ideas
of normality from these efforts of control. It was, of course, one of the achievements of
psychoanalysis  to  investigate  these  interpersonal  dynamics.  However,  with  its  own
unquestioned  abstractions  and  reliance  on  tropes  like  “the  subconscious”  and  its
obsession  with  sexuality,  it  did  not  serve  to  understand  the  complexities  of  social
interaction as much as it could have. There once was an arm of psychiatry that did
concern itself  with these:  transactional psychoanalysis  (Sullivan,  1964;  Berne,  1964).
This school is incidentally the arm of psychoanalysis that is the most closely related to
the  Chicago  roots  of  interactionist  and  pragmatist  scholarship.  Although  their
approach  still  was  not  sociology  (and,  most  importantly,  held  on  to  the  idea  that
pathology was to be corrected), it was much closer than any of the artificially simplified
and  unrealistically  streamlined  explanations  that  have  taken  over  modern  somatic
psychiatry (cf. Moncrieff, 2009; Whitaker, 2009, 2010; Dellwing, 2010). 
40 To apply the Chicago-sociological interests of pragmatist analysis to psychiatry then
means to regain a healthy skepticism when it comes to the biomedical illness-centered
psychiatric categorizations that have gained such a strong foothold in everyday life
discussions about matters such as the one discussed here. While it  is necessary, for
scholarly purposes, to abandon this belief in the truth of psychiatric diagnoses in order
to be able to analyze the interactional dynamics it overwrites, it is necessary to note
that the belief in their truth in everyday life is exactly what gives it its interactional
power. It is, thus, a matter of perspectivity: nothing is good or useful in the abstract.
Psychiatry is good for certain purposes, from certain perspectives, in certain contexts,
for certain groups. Whatever use arises for these “sides” looks like a failure, or at least
a  nuisance,  from  another  side.  To  apply  addiction  definitions  on  people  enforces
involvements,  and  thus  diagnoses  achieve  classifying  “aways”  as  unwanted  and
inappropriate  in  the  light  of  other  expectations  that  are  supported  through  these
diagnoses. Psychiatry achieves such enforcement. Resistance against psychiatry, as has
picked up again in the last decade, achieves a defense of these aways, of the people who
are  diagnosed  with  “diseases”  and  their  involvements,  opposing  the  official  and
powerful  medical-legal  coalitions against  them. Suspending the belief  in psychiatric
diagnoses is a prerequisite for being able to offer a sensible sociological account of the
interactional dynamics involved in the scenes in which psychiatry becomes active. 
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NOTES
1. While this is not the place to discuss this, it is notable that the psychiatric vocabulary in the
DSM  has  retained  the  word  “disorder”  while  placing  an  absolute  emphasis,  in  DSM-III  and
beyond, on the medical model and its conjoined “illness” narrative, the word is the only nod to
psychoanalysis left after the approach was de facto exorcised from the DSM in the 1980s and
remains at odds with its medicalized content and, especially, treatment.
2. This paper was written shortly before the newest version, DSM-V, was issued in May 2013.
3. Emphasis by the author.
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4. This does not mean that they have to take whatever role offered, just that they have to show
that their role negotiation stays in reciprocal interaction with, and ritual deference to, the other
participants of the interaction.
ABSTRACTS
There  is  a  long,  though  now dormant,  dispute  between  sociology  and  psychiatry.  The  most
famous antagonism came with the antipsychiatry movement, which sought to disqualify mental
illness explanations as “false,” as naïve and simplistic objectifications of complex interactional
processes. Effectful as this antagonism was, it effectively pulled up walls between psychiatry and
sociology that remain visible today.
A contemporary sociological appraisal can transcend this conflict by resuscitating old insights
generated by Erving Goffman, who famously stated that did psychiatry not exist, we would have
to invent it (1971). To Goffman, as to pragmatists at-large, meanings are social products. That not
only applies to the biomedical vocabulary, but also to any vocabulary critics wish to put in its
stead, making the constructionist argument toothless for critical purposes (cf. Fish 1989). Rather
than debate their truth or falsehood, pragmatists focus on the social contexts and situations in
which they arise and on what is achieved by them in these concrete situations.
Psychiatric categorizations of people can then be reframed as a tool to mend broken situations
where sociation was in severe disarray in ways that protect valuable social realities: placing the
causal source of the disarray in people’s bodies provides a clear pinpoint for influence work. It is
often a last effort to affect actors whose justifications have retreated into “internalisms” such as
“feelings” that became unreachable for other social negotiations of meaning or those who have
changed behavior in ways that make them unpredictable or predictable in unwelcome ways. This
is not an abstract unpredictability or unwelcome predictability, but one only to those who expect
different roles from them.
This  dynamic  is  well  visible  in  the  case  of  what  the  biomedical  model  now  calls  “Internet
addiction.” The paper will apply Goffman’s work on mental illness as a disturbance of the order
of “place” to this contemporary expansion of the diagnostic canon. Place is here negotiated via
time:  “Internet  addiction”  is  ascribed  to  those  whose  priorities  concerning  their  time
management worry, sadden and anger others. These others define their relationship and other
activities functional to that relationship (i.e. concern with professional and social duties) as “high
priority” and seek to enforce this priority over other uses of time that they mark as “useless,” as
“a misdistribution of time.” The illness vocabulary is thus a practical tool to socially control and
enforce “correct” time-management when other tools fail.
Il existe une longue histoire de conflits, bien qu’aujourd’hui moins ouverts, entre la sociologie et
la  psychiatrie.  L’antagonisme le  plus connu est  venu du mouvement antipsychiatrique,  qui  a
essayé  de  disqualifier  les  conceptions  psychiatriques  de  la  maladie  mentale  en  tant
qu’objectifications naïves et simplistes de processus interactionnels en réalité complexes. Quels
que  soient  les  effets de  cet  antagonisme,  celui-ci  a  effectivement  érigé  des  cloisons  entre
sociologie  et  psychiatrie  qui  demeurent  visibles  aujourd’hui.  Ce  conflit  peut  être  dépassé  en
recourant à d’anciennes perspectives, comme celles d’Erving Goffman qui avait notoirement dit
que si la psychiatrie n’existait pas, il faudrait l’inventer (1971). Pour Goffman, ainsi que pour les
pragmatistes  en  général,  le  sens  est  un  produit  social.  Ceci  ne  s’applique  pas  seulement  au
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vocabulaire biomédical, mais aussi à tout vocabulaire que ses détracteurs souhaitent lui opposer,
ce qui  diminue la portée critique de l’argument constructiviste (cf.  Fish 1989).  Plutôt que de
débattre de leur véracité, les pragmatistes se concentrent sur les contextes et situations sociales
dans lesquels les mots émergent, et sur ce que ces derniers produisent concrètement. Ainsi, les
catégorisations psychiatriques peuvent être repensées comme des outils servant à corriger des
situations de rupture de sociabilité  en situant la  cause du bouleversement dans le  corps des
individus de manière à préserver des réalités sociales valorisées. C’est une manière d’atteindre
des acteurs qui, retranchés derrière des justifications d’ordre interne comme les « émotions »,
évitent  d’autres  négociations  du  sens,  ou  qui  ont  changé  leurs  comportements  socialement
indésirables  ou  imprévisibles.  Cette  dynamique  est  bien  visible  dans  le  cas  de  ce  que  la
perspective biomédicale nomme « l’addiction à Internet ».  Cet article puise dans le travail  de
Goffman sur  la  maladie  mentale  en  tant  que  perturbation  de  l’ordre   « dans  la  place »  pour
l’appliquer à cette extension contemporaine du canon diagnostique. L’espace est ici négocié via le
temps :  « l’addiction à  Internet » est  attribuée à  ceux dont les  priorités  de gestion du temps
inquiètent, attristent ou fâchent autrui. Ces autruis accordent à leur relation et aux activités qui
leur sont  complémentaires  (par exemple des responsabilités  professionnelles  et  sociales)  une
haute  priorité  et  cherchent  à  imposer  cette  priorité  au  détriment  d’autres  usages  du  temps
considérés comme inutiles ou mal agencés. Le vocabulaire pathologique constitue ainsi un outil
pratique pour le contrôle social et l’imposition d’une gestion « correcte » du temps là où d’autres
outils ont échoué.
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